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RESPONSE TO FEDDERS' "WAIVER BY CONDUCT"

Werner de CAPITANI

*

1. General remarks
As a member of the legal staff of a Swiss bank that is involved in two
pending SEC insider investigations [1], I welcome the continuing discussion on
transnational problems affecting the securities markets and appreciate the
opportunity to make a comment on the proposed "waiver by conduct"
approach. Obviously, the Fedders article examines the whole range of fraudulent securities transactions. For practical reasons, I limit my focus to insider
transactions only.
I agree with Mr. Fedders and his co-authors in many respects. In particular,
I agree that (1) there is a common interest in protecting securities markets from
fraudulent conduct; (2) non-U.S. institutions or individuals effecting transactions on U.S. securities markets should submit to the jurisdiction of the United
States; and (3) fraudulent securities transactions should be prosecuted and
punished wherever they occur [2].
Misuse of insider knowledge is not commonly recognized as criminal in
most European countries because transactions of this kind have so far not
posed an acute problem [3]. Only France, Great Britain, and Denmark have
enacted penal provisions to cover trading on inside information. Norway
requires registration of transactions in a company's shares whenever these
transactions involve the company's top executives. Germany and the Netherlands have relied on rules of professional ethics in this area, an approach which
is also envisaged by the EEC [4]. In Switzerland, a report on an insider trading
sanction provision, amending the Penal Code, has recently been released for
public comment [5].
Even though I fully support the fight against insider transactions, I do not
concur with Mr. Fedders' opinion that the waiver by conduct approach
constitutes an- appropriate measure for coping with the problem. I will not
attempt to refute Mr. Fedders' claim that the principle of waiver by conduct
does not imply extraterritorial application of U.S. law; for notions of territoriality differ widely [6]. Nevertheless, a law which aims at setting aside (at least
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partially) obligations created under the laws of another country has, in my
opinion, an extraterritorial tinge [7]. Setting those disagreements aside, I
endorse Commissioner Longstreth's opinion that:
advances in communications have rendered traditional notions of "extraterritoriality" about as
useful a tool for developing law and policy as semaphore is for signaling in modern warfare. The
question can no longer be one of whether a nation's laws should extend beyond its boundaries. We
must ask how best to accommodate the legitimate application of the laws of various nations to
transactions that significantly touch them all [8].

Accordingly, I will confine myself to arguing that Mr. Fedders' proposal would
not serve its purpose and would hamper international cooperation.

2. The waiver by conduct approach is an unsuitable instrument in the fight
against insiders
The waiver by conduct approach creates a presumption whose value depends entirely on its acceptance abroad. If the country in which the financial
institution operates does not recognize the principle, little or nothing is gained,
even though the procedural posture of the SEC before the U.S. courts would be
improved. But enforcement - access to the identity of the insider abroad would be as difficult as it is today. We would also be confronted with the same
conflicts existing today. Taking into account the numerous discovery blocking
statutes (which were enacted mainly as counter-measures against discovery
statutes of the kind under discussion), there is little reason to hope that foreign
countries will sympathize with the waiver by conduct concept. For example, I
simply cannot imagine that a Swiss court would find a presumption created by
foreign law sufficient to repeal Swiss secrecy provisions [9].
Accordingly, the waiver by conduct approach would not equip the SEC with
its desired universal all-purpose tool. It would merely equip it with yet another
instrument it can use against certain foreign financial institutions, namely
those which, due to their presence in the United States, can be pushed into a
dilemma. The dilemma is that of having to choose between lethal sanctions by
the United States or violation of the laws of their home country [10]. It is a
remarkable euphemism to label a procedural tactic luring a defendant into
such a trap as "one of the most significant achievements.., in combating
foreign secrecy laws" or as "a successful example... to use litigation to obtain
information and evidence' [11].
The sanctions proposed by Mr. Fedders as the "sixth step" - dividend
freeze, revocation of voting rights, and transfer suspension [12] - are also likely
to be blunt weapons. A smart insider would get rid of the shares in time to
enjoy the profits of his illicit dealings. Blocking measures would not hurt him.
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The situation would be quite different if we could assume the existence of
an international recognition of the waiver by conduct principle. In my opinion,
this will not occur in the near future.

3. The waiver by conduct approach overshoots the mark and jeopardizes
international cooperation
Irrespective of legal subtleties [13], let us admit that the SEC usually has no
access to the name of the principal behind the bank and is therefore unable to
determine whether or not that principal is an insider. Does this situation
warrant the introduction of a device permitting the indiscriminate disclosure of
the identities of all purchasers and of the details of every transaction on a U.S.
stock exchange? Leaving aside the fact that the implementation of this idea
would ultimately produce the same undesirable results associated with proposed Rule 17a-3(a)(9) [14], I believe that the demand is excessive, that it
ignores an essential element of comity, and that it thwarts efforts for international cooperation.
3.1. The demand is excessive because it goes far beyond what is necessary and
reasonable. Certainly, the SEC must be able to ascertain the names of insiders.
This does not mean, however, that the SEC needs unlimited and unconditional
access to the identity of all participants in U.S. markets, regardless of whether
they are (alleged) wrong-doers [15]. A more considerate approach, producing
the desired result while protecting noninvolved participants from unnecessary
disclosure, should be adopted. Convention XVI provides a model of such an
approach [16]. This view, of course, implies that total disclosure is not the only
solution, and that secrecy when not misused to cloak fraudulent transactions
may be justifiable [17]. I tend to believe that this is an insight which is slowly
gaining recognition in the United States. A look at Convention XVI corroborates this optimistic prognosis. There, the SEC consented to an examination of
potential insider information cases by a neutral Swiss Commission of Inquiry.
A finding by the Commission, concluding that a customer was not an insider,
is binding on the SEC [18]. The consequence is that the identity of a noninsider
need not be disclosed.
3.2. Even in the absence of such an agreement, comity counsels acquiescence
to a foreign law which, though unfamiliar, is considered important by the
country enacting it. It commands restraint where foreign law diverges from the
domestic.
3.3. Finally, waiver by conduct legislation is irreconcilable with existing
patterns of international cooperation. For the Swiss, Fedders' proposal is
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especially objectionable. Switzerland has clearly demonstrated its willingness
to assist the United States in the enforcement of its laws. Instead of asking the
United States to accede to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters of 1959, to which Switzerland has been a party since 1966,
the Swiss agreed to negotiate the Mutual Assistance Treaty [19] which, to a
large extent, makes allowances for peculiarities of U.S. law. This was hailed as
"a pioneering effort" [20] and as "a useful and significant tool in combating
crime and bringing offenders to justice" [21]. Switzerland has strived to
facilitate the SEC's legitimate fight against insiders by adopting highly unusual
and innovative legal procedures such as the Memorandum of Understanding
[22] and Convention XVI. The Swiss have also demonstrated their continued
readiness for cooperation by immediately setting insider legislation into motion
[23]. In light of these facts, the waiver by conduct proposal is resented not only
for its flagrant disregard of obligations assumed under a treaty, but also for
being a very unfriendly gesture [24]. The credibility of the United States as a
partner in international agreements is at stake. Pacta sunt servanda.

4. Conclusion
So far, my comment distinguishes itself by its predominantly negative tone.
Since only constructive criticism is beneficial, I shall try to provide some.
I cannot avoid the impression that the main incentives for Mr. Fedders'
proposal were (1) the threat of blocking statutes, and (2) disappointment with
the complexities of foreign legal assistance and the resulting loss of time.
I have tried to show that one should not delude oneself by expecting that
blocking statutes of one country can be overcome by a presumption created
under the domestic law of another. Apart from this, the idea of countering
blocking laws with other blocking laws is destructive and unlikely to produce
satisfactory results. The waiver by conduct presumption, if not accepted by a
foreign country, will probably not lead to the actual discovery of insiders. Also,
the proposed sanctions (like earlier ones) are likely to hurt noninsiders as well
as financial institutions caught between conflicting legislations, a discouraging
result from which the U.S. stock markets would not benefit.
In conclusion, what I endorse is the neither new nor ingenious idea of
increased international cooperation. Unilateral attempts will not produce real
progress in this matter. True, the prospect of negotiating individual disclosure
agreements with several nations along the lines of Convention XVI is not
attractive. A more attractive alternative might consist in the conclusion of a
multilateral agreement. Such endeavors would greatly be promoted if "a forum
of regulators for the organized, systematic and continuous search for reason
and fairness in dealing with transnational issues of securities regulation" [25]
would be created.
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Notes
[1] SEC v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of. and Call Options for tie
Common Stock of, Santa Fe InternationalCorporation, 81 Civ. 6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court denied
SEC's request for information regarding suspect transactions because the requirement of "dual
criminality" was not met. To satisfy the requirement it must be shown that the conduct under
consideration was a criminal offense in both the United States and the foreign country); SEC v.
Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (the case involves alleged violations of securities laws
by defendant bond traders. Defendants traded on nonpublic material information concerning
tender offers by a law firm's corporate clients. Defendants were "tipped" by the law firm's
manager of the office services department. In this decision, the court granted the SEC's motions
for (1) a preliminary injunction barring defendants from future violations of the securities laws,
and (2) a temporary freeze on profits realized from trades in the securities at issue.) The SEC
alleges that Musella had an account with Credit Suisse over which he executed insider transactions.
[21 Fraudulent conduct, including securities fraud, is an offense in Switzerland, see Art. 148
Penal Code StGB. C.P. COD. PEN.; see also item 19 of the Schedule of the Mutual Assistance
Treaty. However, the Swiss Federal Tribunal recently ruled that fraud requires a personal
relationship between the defrauder and his victim (BGE 109 Ib 54). This type of personal
relationship is absent in securities transactions carried out "through" Swiss banks, see infra note 7.
Therefore, the Federal Tribunal held that insider transactions do not fall within the scope of Art.
148.
[3] This would also partially explain why Swiss banks and officials did not expect the vigorous
attack launched by the SEC against insiders.
Incidentally, there are still those who defend insider transactions as a welcome incentive to a
lively securities market.
[41 Erlauterung zum Vorentwurf fur eine Gesetzgebung fiber missbr-uchliche Verwendung von
Insiderwissen (Report of the Swiss Department of Justice on legislation about misuse of inside
information) 2/3 October 1983.

[51 Id.
[6] For a depiction of the situation see Detlev F. Vagts, The Scope of Application and
Enforcement of U.S. Laws, 35 Wirtschaft und Recht 72 (1983). See also Frank Vischer. The United
States JurisdictionalConcepts Viewed from Abroad, 35 Wirtschaft und Recht 98 (1983).
[71 It should be mentioned that the Fedders article frequently uses imprecise language when it
speaks of transactions "through" foreign institutions. Fedders, Waiver by Conduct - A Possible
Response to tie Internationalizationof the Securities Markets, 6 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. Market L. 1
(1984). See, e.g., pp. 4. 8. Under Swiss law, stock exchange transactions are governed by a
particular type of contract, the so-called commission, Art. 425 et seq. of the Code of Obligations
OR. The relevant sections read as follows:
Art. 425
(1) Any person who undertakes, against payment of a commission fee (commission), to buy or to
sell personal property or financial instruments in his own name but for the account of another (the
principal), is a buying or selling commission agent.
Art. 436
(1) A commission agent who is entrusted with the sale of goods, bills of exchange, and other
financial instruments having an exchange or market value, is allowed, unless otherwise instructed
by the principal, to deliver as a seller for his own account the goods which he is to buy, or acquire
as a purchaser for his own account those which he is to sell.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

W. de Capitani/ Response to Fedders' "'aiverby Conduct"
(2) In these cases, the commission agent is obligated to account for the exchange or market price in
force at the time of carrying out of the mandate, and is entitled to the ordinary commission as well
as to the reimbursement of expenses normally incurred in connection with other transactions on a
commission basis.
(3) In all other respects, the transaction shall be treated as a purchase contract.
A stock exchange transaction is therefore composed of two elements: the (internal) mandate of the
principal to the commission agent to buy or sell, and the (external) purchase or sale by the
commission agent on the stock exchange. Accordingly, the transaction on the exchange of stock is
executed by the agent, not through him. The situation is the same in Germany (German
Handelsgesetzbuch §§ 383 et seq., in particular §§ 400 et seq.). The advantages of the system
consist in its anonymity and in the fact that the customer is dealing with a counterpart (typically a
bank) on whose due performance he can rely, particularly in forward transactions. Incidentally,
this system had already been adopted by the Zurich Securities Exchange Act of 1912.
The duality of the commission implies that the internal part is a matter of Swiss law while the
external part is a matter of the law governing the stock exchange transaction. Accordingly, the
proposed waiver would encroach upon a non-U.S. contractual relationship.
[8] Longstreth, Toward Neutral Principles of InternationalSecurities Regulation, 35 Wirtschaft
und Recht 166 (1983).
[9] Another potential danger is one where an insider organizes a company outside the United
States with bearer shares and with board members from the local community. There are many
countries where such a company can be easily formed. If the company then conducts insider
transactions through a financial institution in a different country, the insider's identity will remain
undisclosed.
[10] SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) [hereinafter referred
to as the St. Joe case] (court held that defendant had deliberately courted legal impediments - the
Swiss nondisclosure laws - and would not be heard to plead that compliance with SEC disclosure
requirements would force defendant to violate foreign laws). This case is a telling example of this
unsatisfactory result, though admittedly the facts were extraordinary.
[11] Fedders, supra note 7, at 14, 15.
[12] Id. § 6.3
[13] One could argue that because of the legal structure of stock exchange transactions under
Swiss law, as described supra note 7, the waiver would only reveal what is already known, namely
the name of the Swiss bank.
[14] Fedders, supra note 7, § 4.3.2.
[15] Wrong-doer is a strong word to use when the scope of the term is not even clear. Cases
like Chiarellav. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980), U.S. v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (1981), cert. denied 52
U.S.L.W. 3240, and Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983) evidence efforts to grope towards a
reasonable demarcation line. They also evidence the danger threatening noninsiders of being
entangled in litigation until their status is clarified. This danger is even more significant where
investigations involve a group of unknown purchasers that is likely to include noninsiders. See, e.g.,
SantaFe case, supranote 1.
The position of noninsiders is less than comfortable to start with, given the precedents
established by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. According to these precedents, a foreign authority's
request for legal assistance is formally sufficient if it itemizes who has allegedly committed what,
and when.
[16] Convention XVI is reprinted in Green, U.S., SwitzerlandAgree to ProsecuteInside Traders,
Legal Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at 19 and 27. See also 22 I.L.M., No. 1, 7-12 (1983).
[17] The summary in Appendix A of Fedders" article, giving the background and rationale of
Swiss bank secrecy, is excellent and fair.
[181 Fedders, supra note 7, §4.2.3.
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[191 27 U.S.T. 2019. T.I.A.S. 8302.
[20] Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations. Treaty with the Swiss Confederation on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters. S. Exec. Doc. No. F, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. V (1976) [hereinafter
Message] (letter of submittal to the President by Robert S. Ingersoll. Dept. of State).
[21] Id. at III. When investigations are conducted under the Treaty, bank secrecy is essentially
lifted. Other provisions, however, have been introduced to protect secrecy. See Art. 10 2 in
connection with Art. 3. 1(a) [Message 48] and Art. 15 [Message 52. 30/311.
[221 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is reprinted in Green. supra note 16. at
17-19. See also I.L.M., supra note 16, at 1-12.
[23] See supra text accompanying note 5.
[24] The judge in the St. Joe case expressed an unacceptable nonchalant attitude when he
dismissed a Swiss defendant's suggestion to use the treaty, as a proposal that would only "send the
SEC on empty excursions".
[25] Longstreth, supra note 8. at 180.
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